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women. Cases in point are divorce, contraception, and abortion (which
in their effects, to say nothing of their nature, are disproportionately
damaging to women). Nussbaum appeals to the words of John Paul II to
support her views about freedom but she ignores his words about the
evils of divorce, contraception, and abortion. In fact, in the case of contraception, she wants to stop the Pope and religious authorities generally from publicly speaking out against it. For contraception, she says, is a
basic human right for women and any religious leader who speaks in
public fora against it should be criticized as a "subverter of the constitution" (she does not say this about those who speak against abortion, but
only, it seems, because some third world feminists speak against it).
Nussbaum seems almost to be biting her tongue when she writes thus.
From the general tone of her remarks one might rather think she was
about to preach an anti-religious crusade or jihad.
Most of the essayists in this collection go after Rawls and / or Audi.
Nussbaum is left untouched, which is curious for she is more open and
up-front about what secular liberalism entails in practice than either of
them. She makes it more explicit that secular liberalism is both a comprehensive doctrine and a novel doctrine, and a doctrine moreover that
is going to oppress religion and the religious whenever it feels itself
strong enough to do so. She makes it clearer, therefore, that secular liberals are the enemies of liberty that George Washington warned us against
in his Farewell Address. Fortunately for the vast majority of Americans
secular liberals are a minority voice in the country, and indeed in academia too. But this book is a timely reminder of the threat they pose. In
this, as in other respects, it is a welcome contribution to the important
discussion now going on about freedom and religion, about their relations and interdependence.

Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body
Problem. David Ray Griffin. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London:
California University Press, 1998. Pp. xv and 266. $45.00 (Cloth).
LEEMON McHENRY, Loyola Marymount University
Ever since Descartes failed to answer the persistent but insightful questions of Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia as to how the mind and body
interact in the pineal gland of the brain, philosophy has been left with
what Schopenhauer called the "world-knot," arguably the problem of
modern philosophy. The sophistication of neuroscience and computer
models of the brain in the past twenty-five years has certainly stimulated interest in the problem, but emerging scientific orthodoxy has been
one-sided. Physicalistic materialism appears to be the only serious alternative to Cartesian dualism mainly because, according to Griffin, it is the
paradigm of both wishful and fearful thinking: "wishful" to the extent
that we believe what we want to be true-in this case, that all phenomena in the universe will be explained finally by materialistic laws; "fear-
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ful" in the sense that we reject a priori what threatens the paradigm-in
this case, that the reality of consciousness presents a terrifying prospect
for the final truth of materialism. To Griffin, however, the "world-knot"
has only tightened around the neck of materialism and substance dualism, both of which, he argues, present insuperable difficulties. He therefore boldly proposes a form of panpsychism-panexperimentalist physicialism-as the neglected solution that has eluded contemporary discussions.
The long and patient labor of unsnarling the knot begins with
Griffin's chapters devoted to common sense, regulative principles, data,
and a detailed analysis of the difficulties of materialism and dualism.
Although he discusses the problems unique to materialism and dualism
respectively, Griffin's focus is on the problems that they share, because
"the naturalistic materialism of late modernity simply eliminated God
and the nonphysical soul from the dualistic supernaturalism of early
modernity, leaving intact its view of nature as insentient matter." (p. 77)
But even the radical forms of materialism implicitly affirm a universe of
two sorts of things: experiencing and nonexperiencing. In what follows,
I will devote my attention to a few of the problems Griffin identifies as
the common root of materialism and dualism, as they lead logically to
the panexperimentalist solution.
(1) Given the continuity suggested by evolution, the line drawn
between experiencing and non experiencing entities is arbitrary.
Descartes had this problem when he distinguished between human
souls and the rest of insentient nature. Now the debate continues up
and down the phylogenetic tree with no clear answer.
(2) Despite the advance of neuroscience and the rejection of all "folk
psychological" explanations, conscious experience is not explicable in
physicalistic terms. Consciousness therefore remains the Great Exception
in need of reconciliation within the paradigm. Materialists have high
expectations that the properties expressed by psychological predicates
will turn out to be physical, but this appears unlikely.
(3) Most importantly, materialism and dualism cannot explain without an explicit or at least implicit supernaturalism how experience arose
out of nonexperiencing actualities. As William James realized, consciousness, however little, is an "illegitimate birth" in any view that professes to explain all the facts by continuous evolution. The emergence of
subjectivity, of what it is like to have an "inside," is not the emergence of
one more objective property or externalistic feature. Consciousness is
not a property that appears for others but rather what it is to be an experience for itself.
Griffin argues that panexperimentalism not only addresses these
problems head on but offers the most intelligible solutions to them. The
first task before him is to construct a view of the "inside" and the "outside," introspection and perception, mind and matter, in such a way that
dualisms are broken down by demonstrating how they share common
characteristics. For example, the view that mind is subjective, temporal,
and unextended while matter is objective, spatial and extended is collapsed into one ontological category of entities conceived as spatio-tem-
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poral units of rudimentary sentience, which are first subjective, then
objective. Such units are understood to be events rather than mental and
physical substances.
This ontology paves the way for understanding how mind and matter
arise from essentially the same stuff. The question: "How does conscious experience arise from insentient neurons?" is reformulated:
"How does conscious experience arise from basic entities that are themselves comprised of experience?" In this manner, Griffin focuses attention on what he calls "nonsensuous perception," examples for which
include the experience of the unity arising from the totality of bodily
experience and the sense of having just emerged from our own immediate past. In other words, our bodily experience is taken to be the closest
direct observation of the workings of nature. We understand nature by
generalizing from how it works in ourselves. (p. 142) Consciousness,
however, is not basic in this scheme of thought; rather it emerges in
degrees of complexity from a rudimentary sentience that pervades the
whole of nature.
Throughout Griffin's book he carefully analyzes much of the contemporary literature on the mind-body problem, including the work of
Thomas Nagel, John Searle, Galen Strawson, Colin McGinn, Geoffrey
Madell, Karl Popper, and Jaegwon Kim. It is, however, clear that the
main inspiration for his own position is derived from the metaphysics of
Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. Griffin is well aware
that the analytic mainstream has not only neglected these thinkers but is
largely contemptuous of them. (p. 115) He is therefore in the difficult
position of explaining the "radical" hypothesis needed to break the
stalemate in the current mind-body debate, but by doing so in terms of a
system of thought vastly alien and perhaps utterly unintelligible to his
audience.
Although Griffin has taken considerable pains to cover the literature
of his opposition, he misses the opportunity to strengthen his position
by rallying support from his allies. British philosopher Timothy
Sprigge, for example, has been the most vigorous proponent of panpsychism today, and specifically for the very reason of providing an intelligible solution to the mind-body problem.! Griffin does discuss William
James's views briefly, but this is overshadowed by his focus on the
details of Whitehead's system, which, he argues, is the strongest form of
panpsychism.
Despite the thoroughness and rigor of Griffin's analysis of the problem and his solution, there are, I think, a few difficulties. First, some
progress has been made in bio-chemistry in explaining how organic
compounds emerge under primitive conditions. In particular, the
Miller-Urey experiment demonstrated how amino acids, the building
blocks of protein, are synthesized from more basic chemical
compounds. 2 Given this limited success, many biologists have speculated that the links in explaining the emergence of life and consciousness
are within our grasp even if the evolutionary "scaffolds" are no longer
in place to understand just exactly how the emergence occurred. The
experimental work here provides a considerable amount of support to
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the materialist paradigm, at least with regard to the probJem of continuity between the inorganic and the organic. Griffin might have strengthened his thesis by discussing and offering his reasons for rejecting the
current work in theoretical biology.
Second, for most of us the panexperimentalist solution is so radical
that it is hard to imagine what kind of sentience is spread throughout
the universe. For example, it is much easier to think of such conditions
arising on Earth, but what about the sentience that forms the basis of the
nuclear-fusion reactions of the sun, the magma of volcanic eruptions or
the vast regions of empty space? In this connection, I doubt many will
be persuaded by Griffin's insistence on the distinction between true
individuals and aggregational composites of such individuals.
Panpsychism (in its various forms) has always been an interesting
hypothesis, if not somewhat exotic and fantastical. To many this will be
its central weakness, namely, the plausibility factor and the obstacle that
it is a theory more suited to romantic idealism rather than serious science or philosophy.
As a fellow traveller in this territory, these are some of the lingering
doubts that have prevented me from embracing panpsychism with open
arms. In my view, however, Griffin does an excellent job of demonstrating that the reigning physicalistic materialism and dualism are even
more implausible than panpsychism. The materialist story just doesn't
quite add up in the end.
For the reader who is convinced that dualism is a dead-end solution
to the debate or simply tired of the arid and colorless discussions of
materialism, this work offers refreshing novelty. Griffin's book deserves
serious attention in order to provide a much-needed perspective and
balance to the mind-body debate.
NOTES
1. See especially, Chapter 3 "The Vindication of Panpsychism," The
Vindication of Absolute Idealism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,

1983).
2. See John L. Casti's discussion of the different biological theories for
how life aros~ from natural, physical processes. Chapter 2 A Warm Little
Pond," Paradigms Lost (New York: Avon Books, 1989).
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Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion by Robin
Le Poidevin. Routledge, 1996. Pp. xxvii, 159.
ANDREW ESHLEMAN, University of Arkansas at Little Rock
This book is primarily a text, but, as the title indicates, Le Poidevin also
makes a case for atheism. After sketching the contents of the book, I will
make some general comments about the author's argument for atheism
and discuss his contention that Western religion can survive the rejection of those metaphysical beliefs traditionally associated with theism. I

